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  This paper tracks the regulatory and policymaking procedures of the Food and   Drug 
  Administration.  It looks at the FDA’s interpretation of regulatory authority in its organic 
  statute, its method of enforcing that statute over the years, and the manner it has  communicated 
  policy decisions.  Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the FDA’s development   and use 
  of guidance documents as a regulatory mechanism.  
 
I.  Introduction 
  The FDA has, for decades, been recognized as an agency uniquely situated for 
administrative innovation.
1  To those familiar with FDA, its influence on administrative law 
should come as no surprise.
2  The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for 
regulation of products comprising 25% of our nation’s economy and its proposed 2010 
budget is $3.2 billion dollars.
3  FDA is charged with an enormous task, to protect the public 
health and the “consumer’s pocketbook.”
4  More impressive than its sheer size, however, is 
the evolution of the FDA’s administrative procedures.  The evolution of the agency’s 
rulemaking approach as well as the transition to reliance on agency guidance documents as a 
primary source of communicating the agency’s views is the focus of this paper.  The paper 
is broken into two parts, each describing major outlets for agency administration, 
rulemaking and informal pronouncements.  Each section describes the historical evolution 
                                                   
1 See Daniel P. Rothschild, The FDA’s Regulations- A Model for the Future?, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J., 344, 346 
(1977) (“FDA is uniquely qualified as a source of administrative innovation, because of the Agency’s specialized 
jurisdiction, the volume of products it regulates, and its tradition of limited judicial review.”) But see, Lars Noah, 
The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Structures), 93 CORNELL L REV. 
901 (2008); and Gary Lawson articles.  
2 Whether this influence has been positive or negative is still debated. For a critical discussion of FDA’s 
advancements see Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory 
Structures), 93 CORNELL L REV. 901 (2008). For a more approving account of the FDA’s actions see Richard A. 
Merrill, FDA and the Effects of Substantive Rules, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 270 (1980); Fred H. Degnan, FDA’s 
Creative Application of the Law: Not Merely a Collection of Words (2000).   
3 http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm; 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2009/NEW02013.html 
4 H. Thomas Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry into the Enforcement of the Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 51 CAL. L. REV. 38, 38 (1963).  of FDA approach to each process and the circumstances surrounding the changes as well as 
the agency’s treatment and impact of each regulatory tool.  
 
II.  History of FDA Regulation  
A.  Early Regulatory History of FDA  
The FDA wasn’t always the mammoth agency it is today.  In fact, as one scholar 
described, “if [the 1906 Act] were all the United States had today, the FDA could probably fit 
into a couple of rooms in Rockville, and we would still not be sure what we were swallowing.”
5  
FDA’s conception can be traced back to the 1899 Imported Foods Act.  Then in 1906 Congress 
passed the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906 Act), which granted the FDA, then the Bureau of 
Chemistry
6, the power to enforce interstate transports of illegal food and drugs.
7  The 1906 Act 
required the Secretaries of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor to promulgate 
regulations to enforce the act.
8  These regulations took less than four months to create, and all of 
the substantive and procedural requirements of the Agency were detailed in less than 20 pages.
9 
                                                   
5 Fran Hawthorne, Inside the FDA: The Business and Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat 40 
(2005).   
6In 1901 the Division of Chemistry became the Bureau of Chemistry and in 1906 the Bureau began to issue Food 
Inspection Decisions pursuant to the Pure Foods Act of 1906.  In 1927, the Food, Drug, and Insecticide 
Administration was established to administer the 1906 Act, (44 Stat. 976, 1003 (1927)—from Hutt 1984 article.) and 
in 1930 that agency was renamed the Food and Drug Administration.( 46 Stat. 392, 422 (1931). FDA was 
transferred from USDA to the Federal Security Agency in 1940, 54 Stat. 1234, 1237 (1940); to the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953, 67 Stat. 631 (1953); and to the Department of Health and Human Services 
in 1979, 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979).” Language from Hutt article 1984.) 
7 John P. Swann, Ph.D., History of the FDA, FDA History Office (adapted from George Kurian, ed., A Historical 
Guide to the U.S. Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)), 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.html 
8 Peter Barton Hutt, About Fairness in Applying the Law,  FDA CONSUMER, June 1981. 
9 Id.    Under the 1906 Act, the FDA functioned mainly as a regulatory police officer
10  The 
agency’s main powers were investigative, with most agency effort spent examining food and 
drugs for evidence of adulteration or misbranding.
11  If the FDA believed they had found a 
violation, they referred the case to a United States Attorney for either civil or criminal 
prosecution.
12  
B.  The Administrative Procedure Act 
  In 1946 Congress forever changed the way agencies regulated industry and created policy 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes detailed procedures agencies must follow 
when conducting a variety of regulatory activities such as administrative hearings, criminal or 
civil enforcement, formal or informal rulemaking  to name a few.  Given the agency’s reliance 
on case by case enforcement at the time the APA was passed, the FDA was concerned mainly 
with its procedures governing administrative hearings.  A brief overview of the APA’s 
requirements for rulemaking is needed to understand the agency’s later shift in regulatory 
approach.  
  Section 553 of the APA details the requirements for agency rulemaking.  The APA 
authorizes two types of legally binding rules.  First, formal rulemaking requires rules be made on 
a record after an opportunity for an agency hearing.
13  Second, informal rulemaking, commonly 
referred to as notice and comment rulemaking, only requires notice of the proposed rule, 
                                                   
10 Joel E. Hoffman, Seventy-fifth Anniversary Commemorative Volume of Food and Drug Law, Edited and Published 
by the Food and Drug Law Institute Series (1984); H. Thomas Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry into the 
Enforcement of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 51 CAL. L. REV. 38, 41 (1963); Eric Claeys, The Food 
and Drug Administration and the Command-and-Control Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 105, 105 (2004); 
Peter Barton Hutt, Food and Drug Regulation in Transition, 35 Food Drug and Cosm. L. J. 283, 285 (1980)(“The 
Agency began as a relatively passive policeman...”). 
11 Id.  
12 Id.; Peter Barton Hutt, About Fairness in Applying the Law; The 1940’s: The Initial Implementation of the New 
Statute, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 21, 22 (1990).  
13 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)  opportunity for public comment, and a statement of the rule’s basis and purpose.
14  Formal 
rulemaking is typically disfavored by agencies and only employed when mandated by statute.
15  
Regulations created pursuant to these procedures are referred to as legislative rules and are 
binding.  Regulations or policies created without adherence to those procedures are non-
legislative and non-binding.  Nonetheless, the APA acknowledges categories of nonlegislative 
rules for which it does not require either formal or informal rulemaking requirements, 
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice” and exempt these from either formal or informal requirements.
16  Such interpretative 
pronouncements are sometimes referred to collectively as publication rules.
17 
At the time the APA was passed, the FDA engaged in primarily case by case 
enforcement.  The FDA had authority to promulgate formal regulations pursuant to Section 701 
of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  Section 701(a) broadly states that 
the Secretary can “promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of this Act.”
18  Indeed, 
H. Thomas Austern, known as the “dean of the food and drug bar” noted in 1961that the agency 
had “probably the broadest powers of rulemaking found in the federal government.”
19  But for 
the first thirty years after passage of the act, this provision was interpreted to confer the power to 
create only interpretative, non-binding regulations.
20  Congress listed in Section 701(e) various 
circumstances where the FDA could create substantive rules that had the force of law, but also 
                                                   
14 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) 
15 Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466 (1992).  
16 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) 
17 Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential 
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 804 (2001).  
18Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a) 1970.  
19 H. Thomas Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry into the Enforcement of the Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 51 CAL. L. REV. 38, 40 (1963). 
20 Katherine Tongue Watts and Thomas W. Merrill, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 558 (2002). required that the FDA employ formal rulemaking procedures to create such rules.  Rules created 
by this method often took years to enact, and, therefore, FDA enforcement of the act continued 
primarily through case–by–case adjudication.
21 
C.  A New Approach to Regulation 
   During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s the FDA majorly shifted its rulemaking 
approach under Section 701(a) of the 1938 Act.  The sea change of the FDA’s approach to 
regulation was a result of both internal and external forces.
22  External forces contributing to this 
change include both Congressional action and judicial approbation.  Within FDA, personnel 
changes proved to be the spark that ignited the flame of a wholesale transformation in the 
agency’s regulatory approach. 
One of the most influential factors was the aggressive Congressional expansion of FDA’s 
responsibilities in the next few decades.  The Durham–Humphrey Amendment of 1951 
(prescription drugs), the 1958 Food Additive Amendments, the Color Additives Amendments of 
1960 (also known as The Delaney Clause), the Drug Amendments of 1962, and The Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 all resulted in an exponential increase in FDA’s jurisdiction.
23  
When first enacted the FDCA spanned only fifteen pages in the U.S. Code, in recent years it has 
surpassed 200 pages.
24  Correspondingly, the agency’s regulations spanned 585 pages in 1956 
and grew to 1,718 in 1969, and its budget grew from $5.1 million in 1955 to $72 million agency 
in 1970.  
                                                   
21 The FDA did create some regulations under Section 701(a), and clearly preferred this method. 
22 Food and Drug Administration History Office, Oral History Interviews:Brandenburg, p 61. 
23 Id. 
24 Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Structures), 93 
CORNELL L REV. 901 (2008) (“[T]he latest edition of the [FDCA] occupies 230 pages.”).  Increased responsibilities left the agency searching for more efficient means of 
regulation.
25  Rules created pursuant to Section 701(e) – also called “rulemaking on a record” or 
“legislation by adjudication” – could sometimes take more than ten years to create.
26  This desire 
for efficiency along with the complexity of the new amendments and industry advancement 
prompted the agency to pursue policymaking through regulation.
27  By the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s FDA’s interpretation of its rulemaking power granted by section 701(a) changed 
dramatically.  The agency began to assert that Section 701(a) granted the FDA the power to 
create legally binding regulations.
28  One of the first examples of FDA’s reliance on Section 
701(a) to create binding rules is the “substantial evidence” rule issued by the agency in 1969, 
which prescribed the kind of clinical test necessary to prove a drug’s effectiveness to the FDA.
29 
If this change in FDA’s perception of its rulemaking power is attributable to one 
individual, his name is Peter Barton Hutt.
30  Following the surprise retirement of his predecessor 
William Goodrich, Hutt started as Assistant General Counsel of the FDA, on Sept. 1, 1971.
 31  
Hutt is often credited with FDA’s “discovery” of its general rulemaking authority.
32  He believed 
                                                   
25 Fred H. Degnan, FDA’s Creative Application of the Law: Not Merely a Collection of Words (2000). 
26 Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1132, 1142 
(1971-1972). 
27 Wayne Pines, Behind FDA’s Regulations, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 10, 1974 
28 The FDA was not alone in its new found interest in informal rulemaking.  “Scholars, in the meantime, were 
awakening to the advantages of informal rulemaking over case by case adjudication.” Peter L. Strauss, From 
Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755 (1996). 
29 Richard A. Merrill, FDA and the Effects of Substantive Rules, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 270, 272 (1980) 
30 Food and Drug Administration History Office, "Oral History Interviews:Brandenburg at 62; Food and Drug 
Administration History Office, "Oral History Interviews: Hile at 18 (“Hutt...literally pushed the Food and Drug 
Administration into modern times  in regards to implementing the full intent and spirit of the Administrative 
Procedures Act.”). 
31 Francis McKay, Lawyers of the FDA—Yesterday and Today, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 621, 626-27 
(1975)(explaining that the position was given the title “Chief Counsel” in October 1974). 
32 Katherine Tongue Watts and Thomas W. Merrill, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 558 (2002); Eric Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-and-
Control Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 105, 120 (2004)(“ Hutt's entrepreneurship and the Second Circuit's 
statutory construction gave the FDA the power to make legislative rules...”). that “all of the regulations issued by the Agency are enforceable in the courts.”
33  The first of 
many judicial opinions addressing this issue came in 1967 with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.
34  The Supreme Court ruled against the FDA in Abbott 
Laboratories, holding that the FDA regulations created pursuant to Section 701(a) constituted 
final agency actions and were subject to pre-enforcement judicial review.
35  The FDA thereafter 
adopted the view that if 701(a) regulations were judicially reviewable, then they also were 
legally binding and more than merely interpretative.
36  Hutt also believed the 1938 Act should be 
thought of as a constitution, and that its broad language permitted the FDA to create any 
regulations reasonably related to the Act’s purpose that wasn’t specifically prohibited.
37  The 
Abbott Laboratories decision coupled with Hutt’s expansive view of FDA’s rulemaking 
authority transformed the agency’s regulatory structure.   
In 1973, the Supreme Court confirmed of the agency’s interpretation of Section 701(a). 
Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, Inc., is known for “dispelling ‘[w]hatever doubts 
might have been entertained regarding the FDA’s power under section 701(a) to issue binding 
regulations.’”
38  Thus began the era of informal rulemaking by the FDA.  In an interview with 
FDA Consumer magazine in November 1974, Hutt described the change in FDA’s perception of 
regulation, shifting from a case-by-case enforcement process to one of explicit regulation 
                                                   
33 Wayne Pines, Behind FDA’s Regulations, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 10, 1974 
34 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
35 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
36Stephen Hull McNamara, The New Age of FDA Rule-Making, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 393, 394-95 (1976). 
37 Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG. 
COSM. L. J. 177, 178 (1973). For a different perspective, see H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation, A Reply 
to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG. COSM. L. J. 189 (1973). 
38 Joel E. Hoffman, Seventy-fifth Anniversary Commemorative Volume of Food and Drug Law 21 (1984)  (Edited 
and Published by the Food and Drug Law Institute Series) (citing National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 
512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975)). Several subsequent judicial opinions confirmed this 
view. See Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645 
(1973); U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973); National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. 
Califano, 603 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1979).  promulgation.
39  Hutt considered regulations to be the “most effective and efficient means of by 
which industry-wide regulation can be achieved.”
40  During this period, the FDA continued to 
issue guidelines and additional forms of policy statements, but the relative merits of informal 
rulemaking compared to other forms of regulation was dominating the debate.
41  
This shift in regulatory approach coupled with the agency’s new expansive jurisdiction 
required corresponding changes within the agency.  In October 1969, the Deputy Undersecretary 
for Health Education and Welfare, Frederic Malek, conducted a review of the operating 
procedures and organization of the agency.
42  The report describes serious problems within the 
agency given lack of formalized procedures.
43  This situation improved, however, when Hutt, 
committed to create detailed policies and procedures for the agency, was joined by newly-
appointed FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt in 1973.
44  As a former medical school dean, 
Schmidt reportedly managed the agency much like a medical school, requiring collegial weekly 
meetings of all key staff in the agency. 
45  The group, consisting of sixteen individuals including 
Dr. Richard J. Crout, FDA Chief Counsel Peter Hutt, the directors of each center, Schmidt and 
others came to be known as the FDA Policy Board.
46  
                                                   
39 Wayne Pines, Behind FDA’s Regulations, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 10, 1974. 
40 Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG. 
COSM. L. J. 177, 183 (1973). 
41 See Donald P. Rothschild, The FDA’s Regulations – A Model for the Future? 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 345 
(1977); Richard A. Merrill, Administrative Rule-Making, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 478 (1975). 
42 Frederic V. Malek, Analysis and Recommendations—The Food and Drug Administration Organizational Review, 
25 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 22 (1970).  
43 Supra note 35.   
44 http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/PastCommissioners/ucm113416.htm, accessed June 19, 
2009.  
45http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/crout/part2.html;http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/p
art3.html “I ran the agency the way those people conceived a university should be run--that is, in a truly collegial 
style, which is what the policy board was.” 
46 Alexander Schmidt, Twenty Questions for the Commissioner, 29 FOOD AND DRUG COSM. L.J. 596, 600 (1974). The Policy Board set all major policy directions for the agency.
47  The Board met at 8:30 
a.m. on Mondays and lasted most of the morning.
48  One attendee recalls such meetings being 
referred to among the group as a “stay–at –home –go–away.”
49  The Board discussed myriad of 
issues, including major regulations, and internal policies such as how the agency should behave, 
who can speak for the agency, what is the status of minutes, etc.
50   
The importance of the Policy Board in solidifying the FDA’s new regulatory scheme 
cannot be overstated.  In fact, Commissioner Schmidt cites the successful creation of the 
agency’s administrative regulations and the creation of the Policy Board as the most significant 
action during his tenure as commissioner.
51  As Dr. J. Richard Crout describes, he and Peter Hutt 
would wrestle with questions such as, “how do you answer the mail, how do you handle appeals, 
what's the role of a petition, what's the meaning of a guideline.”
52 Peter Hutt recalls that,  
“[Dr.] Crout wanted to have the flexibility of providing informal advice to the industry so 
that the industry would have a good idea of how to proceed if they wanted to be certain to 
have FDA agreement. He agreed with me that we didn’t want to put out prescriptive 
regulations that would say you MUST do it this way but he wanted to be able to say, if 
you do it this way we will accept it, if you do it any other way you better come in and talk 
to us and make sure it’s acceptable.”
53 
 
The struggle to codify FDA’s administrative procedures was not resolved with Policy Board 
agreement however.  In September 1975, the FDA published a notice of rulemaking regarding 
the new administrative procedures.
54  Five days before they were to go into effect, the American 
College of Neuropyschopharmacology (“the College”) sued the FDA.  The College claimed the 
FDA did not follow APA procedures, by not promulgating the regulations subject to the notice 
                                                   
47 Id.; Alexander Schmidt, Twenty Questions for the Commissioner, 29 FOOD AND DRUG COSM. L.J. 596, 600 
(1974).  
48 Id.  
49 Food and Drug Administration History Office, "Oral History Interviews: Barkdoll.” 
50 Id.  
51 http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/part3.html 
52 http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/crout/part2.html 
53 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, January 17, 2009.  
54 Administrative Practices and Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 40682 (Sept. 3, 1975). and comment requirements of APA § 553.
55  The district court agreed, and the Commissioner 
acquiesced, realizing that obeying the court order rather than challenging it would be the 
quickest form of action.
56  Thus, FDA’s proposed administrative procedure regulations were 
published on September 3, 1975.
57   
Consistent with the Policy Board’s goals, the FDA also began to use extensive preambles 
to regulations in the Federal Register to explain the purpose of the regulation.
58  Before the 
agency would publish regulations, it would receive comments pursuant to the APA’s notice and 
comment rulemaking requirements.  Sixty days after proposing the regulation, the agency would 
compile the comments and respond to each in a detailed preamble to the final regulation.
59  
Preambles described the agency’s decision-making process and provided a good paper trail for 
any future court challenges to a regulation.
60  
The FDA wasn’t the only agency to recognize the advantages of informal rulemaking, 
however.  The efficiency of the process quickly led to informal rulemaking becoming the choice 
regulatory tool for agencies.
61 This exponential increase in agency discretion led individuals 
across all branches of government to consider ways to reign in agency promulgation of 
regulations.  Additional requirements imposed by the judicial, executive, and legislative branches 
led to what many refer to as the “ossification” of notice and comment rulemaking  Congressional 
requirements such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, the Paperwork Reduction 
                                                   
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Virgil O. Wodicka, 1970’s: The Decade of Regulations, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 59, 61 (1990); Food and Drug 
Administration History Office, "Oral History Interviews: Hile” (explaining that prior to Hutt’s tenure preambles 
may have been 100 words long, and Hutt began publishing preambles as long as one hundred pages).  
59 Wayne Pines, Behind FDA’s Regulations, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 10, 1974 
60 Id.  
61John C. Carey, The FDA’s Policymaking Quandary: Is Guidance Reform and Appropriate Solution? (1997), in 
Peter Barton Hutt, ed., Food and Drug Law:  An Electronic Book of Student Papers (citing ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING ix (2d ed. 1991)).  Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Data Quality Act, the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act have all contributed to the widely accepted notion that informal 
agency rulemaking has become “ossified.”
62  According to an April 2009 Government 
Accountability Office report, “a straightforward rulemaking make take up to 3 ½ to nearly four 
years from initiation to final publication.”
63  Typically, only the degree of ossification present 
had been debated.  Recent scholarship, however, has called into question the core ossification 
thesis.
64  Regardless of the truth of this assertion, it is true that many agencies have increasingly 
relied on alternatives to notice and comment rulemaking.
 65  These alternatives, along with other 
means of informal agency policymaking is the topic of the second half of this paper.   
 
III.  History of FDA’s Interpretative Regulatory Pronouncements 
Statements of agency interpretation and policy are not a modern invention.  The 
Department of Interior used tools during the mid-nineteenth century.
66  Not until the FDA 
published its “Good Guidance Practices” on February 18, 1997 did American administrative law 
                                                   
62 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437, 448 (2003) (“Major rules 
take a minimum of five years to be adopted. Judicial review involves additional delay...”); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rule-making Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992) (looking at the evidence and 
causes of ossification). Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). For a more detailed discussion 
of individual causes of ossification see John C. Carey, The FDA’s Policymaking Quandary: Is Guidance Reform and 
Appropriate Solution? (1997), in Peter Barton Hutt, ed., Food and Drug Law:  An Electronic Book of Student 
Papers. 
63 GAO report pg 22 
64 See Lisa Schwartz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1819-
1820 (2007); Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic 
Performance: Is Federal Rulemaking “Ossified”?, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1079 (2009).  
65 John C. Carey, The FDA’s Policymaking Quandary: Is Guidance Reform and Appropriate Solution? (1997), in 
Peter Barton Hutt, ed., Food and Drug Law:  An Electronic Book of Student Papers; Lars Noah, The Little Agency 
that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Structures), 93 CORNELL L REV. 901 (2008), Erica 
Seiguer and John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-
Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 17, 29-30 (2005). For an overview of various agencies reliance on 
interpretative rules and Xxx see Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretative Rules and 
Policy Statements, 4 ACUS 615 (1974-1977).  For a look at the current judicial treatment of guidance documents 
and their importance to administrative agencies, see Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern Administrative 
Law: Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 657 (2008).  
66 Sam Kalen, Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
13, 14 (2008).  have a distinct category of legal documents called “guidance.”
67  Furthermore, it is arguable that 
the FDA has developed and expanded the use of guidance as an alternative to notice and 
comment rulemaking more so than any other agency.
68  “Since the start of this decade there has 
been a striking increase in the number of FDA – issued documents intended to give guidance to 
the regulated industry but not adopted through public procedures.”
69  Guidance was not the start 
of the FDA’s informal pronouncements though.  Since 1899 the agency has used numerous tools 
to communicate its policies and interpretation of statutory commands. 
A.  Food Inspection Decisions & Service and Regulatory Announcements 
Beginning in 1899, the Department of Agriculture’s Division of Chemistry, charged with 
enforcing the 1899 Imported Food Act, issued Food Inspection Decisions.  Food Inspection 
Decisions (FIDs) were interpretations of the Imported Food Act and the first statements of 
interpretation or policy in the food and drug world.
 70  Hundreds of these decisions were 
published, but only the first thirty-nine of which were interpretations of the 1899 Act.
71  Food 
Inspection Decisions beginning with number forty (FID-40) interpreted the 1906 Federal Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act.
 72  The final Food Inspection Decision was issued in 1934, FID- 212.
73  
                                                   
67 Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 159, 159 (2000) (noting however that such terms had previously been used in Japan and Korea).  
68 For a discussion of FDA’s general disregard for Constitutional and Congressional requirements in the furtherance 
of such objectives, see Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and 
Statutory Structures), 93 CORNELL L REV. 901 (2008). Additionally, the FDA is not the only agency to heavily use 
this APA exception. For a discussion of four other agencies use of interpretive rules and statements of policy see 
Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 3 (1977).  
69 Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 159, 168 (2000) (“The rate per year for the 1990s is about four hundred percent greater than the rate for the 
1980s.”). 
70 Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Structures), 93 
CORNELL L REV. 901 (2008). 
71http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/ResearchingFDAwithPublishedPrimarysource
s/default.htm 
72 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, Introduction 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951). Xv.  
73 Id.  The agency included FIDs in collection of published documents called Service and Regulatory 
Announcements (SRAs).  The Bureau of Chemistry began to issue Service and Regulatory 
Announcements in 1914; they were initially published monthly and then on an irregular basis.
74  
The aim of these publications was to “aid manufacturers by informing them about statutory 
requirements applicable to their products.”
75  Food Inspection Decisions and Service Regulatory 
Announcements informed industry of changes affecting enforcement of the 1906 act.
76  
However, the SRAs included formal Food Inspection Decisions as wells as other “policy matter 
that did not have the formality of FIDs, subject to prompt change if developments warranted.”
77  
SRAs were published until shortly after the Congress passed the 1938 Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
78  The Bureau stopped issuing interpretive service announcements with 
No.28 in 1923, due mainly to the fact that “the legal requirements of the 1906 Act had become 
fairly well understood.”
79   
B.  Trade Correspondence 
  The passage of the 1938 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which greatly 
expanded FDA’s regulatory powers, spurred a host of questions from industries required to 
                                                   
74 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, Introduction 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951). 
75 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, XV (Chicago: 
Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951).  
76 Peter Barton Hutt, About Fairness in Applying the Law; The 1940’s: The Initial Implementation of the New 
Statute, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 21, 23 (1990).  Additionally, beginning in October 1906, “the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture issued ‘Rules and Regulations for the Enforcement of the Food and Drugs Act’ as Circular No. 21 
from the Office of the Secretary.” 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/ResearchingFDAwithPublishedPrimarysources/
default.htm.   
77http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/ResearchingFDAwithPublishedPrimarysource
s/default.htm.  ; Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, 
Introduction (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951). 
78http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/ResearchingFDAwithPublishedPrimarysource
s/default.htm.   
79 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, Introduction 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951). comply with the law and regulations.
80  After passage of FDCA in 1938, and until 1946, FDA 
issued responses to inquiries regarding enforcement of FDCA as advisory opinions called “Trade 
Correspondence.”
81  These were not legally binding, not published, and not compiled or 
reviewed in any systematic way by FDA.  They were, however, distributed to staff and kept at 
FDA headquarters, available for inspection.
82  In November 1945, the FDA began a new series 
of Trade Correspondence, labeled “TC1-A”, “TC2-A”, etc.
83    The FDA released a total of 431 
trade correspondences before the FDA, adhering to the APA, discontinued the use of Trade 
Correspondence in exchange for a more formal process for announcement of policy.
84  
Beginning in 1946, FDA policies were published in the Federal Register as “Statements of 
General Policy or Interpretation.”
85  The amount of statements released by the FDA decreased 




C.  Compliance Policy Guides 
  In 1968, initiated by Deputy Commissioner Winton B. Rankin, the FDA created the 
Compliance Policy Guide system.
87  Rankin envisioned a system that would “compile and revise 
the previous sources of policy information for incorporation into a single issuance system, and 
provide the format and mechanics for compiling and disseminating all future policy 
                                                   
80 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, Introduction 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951); Joel E. Hoffman, Seventy-fifth Anniversary Commemorative 
Volume of Food and Drug Law, Edited and Published by the Food and Drug Law Institute Series (1984). 
81 Paul B. Dunbar, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law: Administrative Reports 1907-1949, Introduction 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1951); 21 CFR 40694 (1975).   
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Vincent A. Kleinfeld and Charles Wesley Dunn, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Judicial and 
Administrative Record, 1938-1949 (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, c. 1949) 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Compliance Policy Guide, 1973 Transmittal No. 73-1 (12/03/73) Issuing office, EDRO, Division of Field 
Operations. information.”
88  The first Compliance Policy Guide Manual was released by the Bureau of 
Compliance in 1969, but contained few policies.
89  In 1972, Assistant Commissioner of 
Compliance Sam D. Fine ordered the reissuance of the Compliance Policy Guides.
90  The 1973 
Compliance Policy Guide Manual introduction explains that “[the Guides] describe the agency’s 
official policy on a compliance matter if a policy has been established. By contrast, the 
administrative guidelines outline the conditions which must be present before the agency will 
invoke the legal sanctions of any act enforced by the FDA.”
91  The FDA website further explains 
that statements made in the CPG do not create any rights but “are intended for internal 
guidance.
92  
D.  Advisory Opinions & Guidelines 
  Advisory opinions are now the name given to trade correspondence created between 1938 
and 1946, compliance policy guides, any notices in the Federal Register that are not the proposed 
or final regulations.
93  Advisory opinions are formal positions of the FDA, can be amended and 
revoked, but if industry conducts business in a manner proscribed in an advisory opinion, no 
adverse action will be taken by FDA.
94  The FDA’s regulations state, however, that in “unusual 
situations involving an immediate and significant danger to health, the Commissioner may take 
appropriate civil enforcement action contrary to an advisory opinion before amending or 
revoking the opinion.”
95 
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89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm116791.htm 
93 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (d) (2000). 
94 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (e), (g) 
95 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (f)   Along with Trade Correspondence and Compliance Policy Guides, FDA “guidelines” 
were considered a type of advisory opinion.
96 As explained above, the idea of guidelines was 
created in the context of FDA’s Policy Board and was included in the procedural regulations 
promulgated in 1975.  The regulations defined the new tool,  
  “Guidelines relate to such matters as performance characteristics, preclinical and clinical 
  test procedures, manufacturing practices, product standards, scientific protocols, 
  compliance criteria, ingredient specifications, labeling, or other technical or policy 
  criteria. Guidelines state procedures or standards of general applicability which are not 
  legal requirements but which are acceptable to the Food and Drug Administration for a 
  subject matter-which falls within the laws administered by the Commissioner, e.g., a 
  protocol for a particular type of animal toxicity test or human clinical trial.”
97  
 
The proposed regulations emphasized that a person does not have to follow the procedure in the 
guideline.  The Commissioner further explained that a person may, but should not feel required 
to discuss any divergence from a guideline with FDA.  “Until modified or revoked, they would 
represent the formal opinion of the agency and bind the agency to that position.”
98  FDA 
Consumer magazine praised the benefits of the new regulations, stating “it will be a lot easier for 
any member of FDA’s publics—consumer, industry, professional—to make his voice heard in 
Agency decisions.”
99 
E.  Other Agency Policy Pronouncements 
  In addition to guidelines, the FDA issues recommendations, agreements and 
memorandums of understanding, which advise various entities of FDA’s positions and views 
without rising to the level of regulations.
100  The FDA enters into memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) with entities such as federal, state and local governments, academic 
                                                   
96 21 C.F.R. 40729 (1975) Peter B. Hutt, Lewis A. Grossman, and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases 
and Materials 1368 (3d ed. 2007).   
97 21 C.F.R. § 40730 (1975).  
98 21 C.F.R. § 40696 (1975). 
99 Emil Corwin, Putting FDA’s Procedural House in Order, FDA CONSUMER, July August 1975  
100 21 C.F.R. § 10.90 institutions and others to “define lines of authority or responsibility, or to clarify cooperative 
procedures.”
101  These are formal, but nonbinding agreements.
102  In a 1996 proposed regulation, 
the FDA declared that “well over a thousand such documents exist,” referring to various types of 
agency pronouncements described above and additionally, points to consider, blue book 
memos.
103 
F.  Non-binding Status of Policy Statements 
  In 1977, an FDA regulation declared that advisory opinions, including trade 
correspondence, compliance policy guides, and guidelines, would be binding.
104  In October 
1992, however, the agency announced that, pending a final rule, advisory opinions and 
guidelines would no longer bind the agency, bind the public, nor confer any rights upon the 
public.
105  In the preamble to the proposed changes, FDA indicated the changes were an attempt 
to bring FDA’s practice in line with current case law, and be “consistent with principles of 
estoppel and sound public policy.”
106  FDA explained this switch was to ensure such documents 
were not misleading to the public given judicial treatment of such guidelines as non-binding and 
to ensure FDA’s treatment of them did not conflict with the recent court decision, Community 
Nutrition Institute v. Young (CNI).
107  CNI held that regulatory “action levels,” which limited 
FDA’s discretion as to when they would enforce certain statutory provisions, were binding 
substantive rules, and, as such, must be promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking 
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103 61 Fed. Reg. 9181, 9182 (1996) 
104 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708-10 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. 10.85, 10.90 (1997)). 
105 Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314, 47-314 (Oct. 
15, 1992). 
106 Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314, 47-314-15 
(Oct. 15, 1992). 
107 818 F. 2d 943  (D.C. Cir. 1987); Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 
Fed. Reg. 47,314, 47-315 (Oct. 15, 1992). procedures to be valid.
108   While the CNI opinion concerned regulatory action levels, not 
advisory opinions or guidelines, the FDA’s preamble explains that this decision “calls into 
question FDA’s procedures for issuing advisory opinions and guidelines that purport to be 
binding FDA.”
109  
This announcement was criticized by many.
110  One organization, the Indiana Medical 
Device Manufacturers Council, submitted a citizen petition to the FDA in May 1995 requesting 
the FDA allow public participation on this issue.
111  The Subcommittee on National Economic 
Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Resources 
and Intergovernmental Relations held a joint hearing on the issue on September 14, 1995.
112 
Succumbing to these pressures, in March 1996, the FDA issued requests for comments on this 
issue in the Federal Register.
113  This resulted in publication of the FDA’s “Good Guidance 
Practices” (GGP’s) in 1997.
114  
G.  Guidance Documents 
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109 Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314, 47-314-15 
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110 See Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 
113 (1997) (“The proposed wholesale renunciation of hundreds of formal advisory opinions and guidelines on which 
regulated firms have come to rely cannot, however, be justified.”) However, FDA explained that “[a]lthough most 
comments agreed with the agency's position that guidance should not be binding on the public, a number did argue 
that FDA should be required to follow its own guidance.” The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, 
Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 8962-63 (Feb. 27, 1997). 
111 Guidance Documents; The Food and Drug Administration’s Development and Use; Request for Comments, 61 
Fed. Reg. 9181 (Mar. 7, 1996). 
112 John C. Carey, The FDA’s Policymaking Quandary: Is Guidance Reform and Appropriate Solution? (1997), in 
Peter Barton Hutt, ed., Food and Drug Law:  An Electronic Book of Student Papers. 
113 Guidance Documents; The Food and Drug Administration’s Development and Use; Request for Comments, 61 
Fed. Reg. 9181 (Mar. 7, 1996). 
114 The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 
8961 (Feb. 27, 1997).   At some point between 1992 and 1996, the FDA introduced the term guidance 
documents.  Both terms appear in the 1993 Federal Register.
115  The FDA explained in 1996, 
however, that “[g]uidance documents currently are issued under a number of different names, 
(e.g., guidelines, guidance, points to consider, blue book memos, compliance policy guides, 
etc.).”
116  In 2000, FDA ensured that the nomenclature “guidelines” would only live on in 
administrative law history, as they formally switched to using the term “guidance document” for 
all forms of agency guidance. 
117  Prior to the issuance of this final rule, a book on FDA 
regulations explained that “[i]n between regulations and guidance documents are “guidelines.”
118  
While this switch in nomenclature does correspond to the shift from binding to nonbinding status 
of these documents, there is nothing in the Federal Register to support this specific alignment.  
This should not be taken as proof of the falsehood of the statement, but rather, simply reinforce 
the confusion at that time surrounding the status of both guidelines and guidance documents. 
H.  Guidance Document Reform 
  In 1997 Congress again amended the FDA’s organic statute.  The Food and Drug 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) codified parts of the agency’s 1997 Good Guidance 
Practices and specified additional requirements.
119  One important requirement was that 
notwithstanding the non-binding nature of guidance documents, “the Secretary shall ensure that 
employees of the [FDA] do not deviate from such guidances without appropriate justification 
                                                   
115 International Conference on Harmonization; Studies in Support of Special Populations; Geriatrics; Draft 
Guideline, Availability, 58 Fed. Reg. 21082 (Apr. 16, 1993) and Guidance Documents on Refusal to File New Drug 
Applications, Availability 58 Fed. Reg. 38770 (July 20, 1993).   
116 Guidance Documents; The Food and Drug Administration’s Development and Use; Request for Comments, 61 
Fed. Reg. 9181, 9182 (Mar. 7, 1996). 
117  Administrative Practice and Procedures, Good Guidance Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 56468, 56475 (Sept. 19, 
2000)(“all guidelines are now treated as guidance documents”).  
118 Fred H. Degnan, FDA’s Creative Application of the Law: Not Merely a Collection of Words 11 (2000).   
119 While typically, direct Congressional endorsement of agency action would be considered positive, however, Lars 
Noah refers to FDAMA as just another instance of the FDA finding a “convenient shortcut[] for communicating its 
expectations to regulated entities.” Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act With Indifference to Constitutional 
and Statutory Structures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 905 (2008). and supervisory concurrence.”
120  Additionally, FDAMA required the FDA to create an agency 
system equipped to hear complaints concerning the FDA’s guidance document procedures, to 
“maintain electronically and update and  publish periodically in the Federal Register a list of 
guidance documents.”
121  FDAMA also requires the FDA to allow and consider public comments 
prior to implementation of guidance documents that are “initial interpretations of a statute or 
regulation, changes in interpretation or policy of more than a minor nature, complex scientific 
issues, or highly controversial issues.”
122  For guidance documents that “set for existing practices 
or minor changes in policy” public comment at the time of implementation is adequate.
123  
Lastly, FDAMA directed the FDA to evaluate the Good Guidance Practices and issue final 
regulations consistent with FDAMA prior to July 2000.
124   
  The last major amendments to FDA’s regulatory procedures occurred in 2000 as 
prescribed by FDAMA.
125  The agency proposed the changes in February 2000 and received 
eighteen comments, mainly from trade organizations supporting the changes.
126  As defined by 
the 2000 amendments, “guidance documents are documents prepared for FDA staff, 
applicants/sponsors, and the public that describe the agency’s interpretation of or policy on a 
regulatory issue.”
127  The FDA maintained the Level 1 and 2 divisions introduced in the 1997 
Good Guidance Practices and explained the procedures for developing each.  Level 1 guidance 
includes “initial interpretations of statutory or regulatory requirements,” major changes in 
                                                   
120 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 405, 21 U.S.C. 371(h)(1)(a) (1997).For a discussion 
regarding the murkiness of what “appropriate justification” encompasses, see James Hunnicutt, Another Reason to 
Reform the Federal Regulatory System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
153 (1999).  
121 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 405, 21 U.S.C. 371(h)(1)(a) (1997). 
122 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 405, 21 U.S.C. 371(h)(1)(a) (1997). 
123 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 405, 21 U.S.C. 371(h)(1)(a) (1997). 
124 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 405, 21 U.S.C. 371(h)(1)(a) (1997). 
125 FDAMA required the FDA to evaluate the effectiveness of their Good Guidance Practices before July 1, 2000 
and promulgate a regulation consistent with FDAMA “specifying the policies and procedures of the Food and Drug 
Administration for the development, issuance, and use of guidance documents.” 
126Administrative Practices and Procedures; Good Guidance Practices, 65 Fed. Reg. 56468 (Sept. 19, 2000).  
127 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2000). interpretation or policy, or guidance related to complex scientific issues or highly controversial 
issues.
128  Level 2 includes all guidances not classified as Level 1.
129  The procedures for 
promulgating Level 1 are much more detailed than those for Level 2 guidances.   
  Level 1 
 
“FDA can seek or accept early input from individuals or groups outside the agency. For 
example, FDA can do this by participating in or holding public meetings and workshops. 
After FDA prepares a draft of a Level 1 guidance document, FDA will: (A) Publish a 
notice in the Federal Register announcing that the draft guidance document is available; 
(B) Post the draft guidance document on the Internet and make it available in hard copy; 
and (C) Invite your  comment on the  draft  guidance  document...After FDA  prepares a 
draft  of  a  Level  1  guidance  document,  FDA  also  can:  (A)  Hold  public  meetings  or 
workshops; or (B)  Present  the  draft  guidance  document to an advisory  committee  for 
review.  After  providing  an  opportunity  for  public  comment  on  a  Level  1  guidance 
document, FDA will: (A) Review any comments received and prepare the final version of 
the  guidance  document  that  incorporates  suggested  changes,  when  appropriate;  (B) 
Publish  a  notice  in  the  Federal  Register  announcing  that  the  guidance  document  is 
available; (C) Post the guidance document on the Internet and make it available in hard 




“FDA will: (A) Post the guidance document on the Internet and make it available in hard 
copy;  (B)  Immediately  implement  the  guidance  document,  unless  FDA  indicates 
otherwise when the document is made available; and (C) Invite your comment on the 
Level 2 guidance document...If FDA receives comments on the guidance document, FDA 
will review those comments and revise the document when appropriate. If a version is 
revised,  the  new  version  will  be  placed  on  the  Internet.  You  can  comment  on  any 
guidance  document  at  any  time...FDA  will  revise  guidance  documents  in  response  to 
your comments when appropriate.” 
The rules clarify, however, that the FDA will not seek comments before issuing a Level 1 
guidance document if it is not “feasible or appropriate.”
130  If a Level 1 guidance document is 
issued without prior public participation though, the FDA will allow comments after publication 
of the guidance document, review those comments, and make revisions if necessary.
131 Given the 
procedural regulations that now govern the issuance of guidance documents, some FDA 
                                                   
128 Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (b) (2000).   
129 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2000). 
130 21 U.S.C. §371, 10.115 
131 Id.  employees have commented that “in practice they take as long as rules to develop.”
132 As one 
scholar notes, “[i]t would not be far-fetched to [say] . . . that the FDA now proposes to issue its 
important regulations mostly in accordance with the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure 
set forth in the APA, as it was understood before 1970.”
133 
  FDA and Congress were not the only entities interested in increasing oversight and 
accountability of guidance documents.  Almost ten years after the FDA first established its 
comprehensive policy for the issuance and development of guidance documents, President Bush 
issued Executive Order 13,422 in 2007.  Executive Order 13,422 and the Office of Management 
and Budget’s (OMB) corresponding “Final Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices” (bulletin), 
extended inter-agency review to agency guidance documents.
134  The executive order required 
agencies to provide the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) advance notice of 
any significant guidance document.
135  Additionally, the OMB bulletin created a sub-division of 
significant guidance documents, entitled “economically significant” guidance documents.  The 
bulletin requires notice in the Federal Register, opportunity for comments, response to 
comments, before issuing a final economically significant guidance document.
136  According to 
FDA Policy Advisor, Eric Flamm, the FDA had never classified any guidance document as 
“economically significant,” thus bringing it within the scope of OMB’s requirements.
137  On 
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135 Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2764 (Jan. 23, 2007). 
136 Memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies, and independent regulatory agencies, Rob 
Portman, M-07-13, April 25, 2007 
137 Email from Eric Flamm, February 27th, 2009 FDA Policy Advisor, “FDA never categorized any guidances it 
sent to OMB as economically significant under the executive order.” January 30th, 2009, President Obama revoked Executive Order 13,422.
138  It remains to be seen 
what requirements, if any, the Obama Administration will impose on agency guidance 
documents.  
I.  Criticism of Guidance Documents 
  The amount of analysis and revision FDA’s guidance document process has received 
begs the question of whether this process is a favorable means of agency policymaking.  
Professor Todd Rakoff best summarizes the two schools of thought regarding FDA’s use of 
guidance documents, “[it] can be seen either as an example of thoughtful and balanced 
institutional creativity, or as a brazen attempt to subvert the APA as construed by the courts.”
139 
Criticisms generally fall into three categories: that the FDA will treat them as de facto rules, that 
there is too little transparency, accountability and public involvement, and that the entire system 
creates more confusion than clarity.
140  Each of these will be discussed in turn.  
The process for developing and issuing guidance documents is no longer the dark 
scenario described by the D.C. Circuit, “[l]aw is made without notice and comment, without 
public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal 
Regulations.”
141  The imposition of numerous procedural rules governing the issuance of agency 
guidance documents however has not assuaged concerns by many that the process lacks 
accountability, transparency, and meaningful public participation.  Many administrative law 
scholars criticize agency reliance on guidance documents for its abandonment of accountable 
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901, 905 (2008). 
141 Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015,1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) policymaking.
142  Professor Rakoff criticizes, “[w]hat the FDA did was to take the APA’s lenient 
attitude toward interpretative rules and policy statements and convert it into a wholly alternative 
system of regulation.”
143   
Even though guidance documents are not legally binding, administrative law scholars, 
agency employees and industry representatives all express concern that, in practice they operate 
the same.
144  “Even though those documents do not have legally binding effect, they have 
practical binding effect whenever the agencies use them to establish criteria that affect the rights 
and obligations of private persons.”
145  In a 2005 study of industry perspectives on FDA 
guidance documents, one subject responded, “in practice most of those interviewed said that 
industry treats guidances no differently than rules.”
146  “From the industry's point of view, it is 
more a combination of grudging acceptance, plus fear, plus desire for a gold star that can be used 
in marketing, plus the natural tendency of anyone to gripe about whoever is in a position of 
authority over them.”
147   
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147Fran Hawthorne, Inside the FDA: The Business and Politics Behind the Drugs We Take and the Food We Eat 124 
(2005).  While an empirical study testing the hypothesis that guidance documents act as de facto 
rules is greatly needed, this information would be difficult if not impossible to accurately 
compile.  Proof of this criticism can only found in industry board rooms or discussions with 
attorneys faced with the decision to abide by the terms of the guidance documents.
148  No one 
formally complains or files suit for fear of establishing an adverse relationship with FDA, a 
relationship that industry relies on maintaining.
149  Others, however, have expressed concern that 
because guidance documents “do not even constrain agency officials” regulated entities are left 
“guessing about their rights and obligations.”
150  
J.  Additional Areas for Research 
  A comprehensive, yet detailed, overview of the century-long history FDA of rulemaking and 
policymaking is beyond the scope of one paper.  One area ripe for additional research is a systematic 
study of the number and types of guidance documents promulgated per year.  Initial research has 
been conducted by a few individuals.  John C. Carey’s analysis of the FDA’s use of guidance 
between 1985 and 1995 provided a great starting point.  His research showed that “between 1985 
and 1989 the FDA issued 11.6 guidances per year, whereas, between 1990 and 1995 the FDA 
issued 60.7 guidances per year; an increase of approximately 425%.”
151  Erica Seiguer and John 
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  Figure A below exhibits a continuation of the research conducted by John C. Carey in 
1997, displaying the trend of FDA’s promulgation of rules in the past ten years.
156  To compile 
the data reflected in Figure A, I counted the number of FDA rules listed in the Federal Register 
Index for each year.  In addition, I used the legal research database, Westlaw to electronically 
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IV.  Conclusion 
  The evolution of FDA’s methods for creating regulations and policies has made it the 
subject of both harsh criticism and high praise.  Overwhelming statutory responsibilities has 
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regulation and policy creation.  Whether this has resulted in an erosion of agency accountability 
and public participation or a more efficient means of detailed policy creation and statutory 
interpretation will surely continue to be debated.  More research and analysis is needed before 
we can begin to assess the effects of this change in regulatory approach.  What is certain is that 
the past two decades have solidified the status of guidance documents as a major tool of FDA 
policymaking.   
 